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Summary
Candida auris, a globally emerging pathogen, has been
repeatedly introduced into European healthcare settings,
leading to large and long-lasting nosocomial outbreaks.
The pathogen has already been isolated in Switzerland,
requiring clinicians and microbiologists to become alert.
This is the first comprehensive guidance document on pre-
vention and control of C. auris in Swiss acute care hospi-
tals. It brings to light the most recent evidence from pub-
lished original articles and reviews. We emphasise the
importance of quickly identifying this yeast by means of
screening in order to prevent an outbreak that could be dif-
ficult to contain. Key containment strategies include rein-
forcing early detection, hand hygiene, application of strict
contact precautions for colonised and infected patients,
and thorough specific environmental cleaning and disin-
fection.
Introduction
Candida auris was unknown before 2009. After its first
isolation from a Japanese patient’s external ear discharge
[1], it rapidly spread worldwide [2] and hit several health-
care settings, producing large nosocomial outbreaks that
were difficult to contain [3–5]. In clinical studies, C. auris
has been isolated from various materials [3, 6], and ex-
periments have shown growth on dry and moist surfaces
for several days [7, 8]. Its particular ability to persist in
the hospital environment apparently forced one hospital in
New York to rip out some ceiling and floor tiles in order
to eradicate this tenacious yeast [9]. Most C. auris isolates
are resistant to fluconazole and voriconazole, and exhibit
variable non-susceptibility rates to other antifungal class-
es such as amphotericin and echinocandins [2]. Most wor-
rying, however, is that there are already reports of pan-re-
sistant C. auris [10, 11]. This is of major concern since
treatment options in the event of invasive infection will be
extremely limited. C. auris is more likely to cause inva-
sive infections, including candidaemia, than other species
of Candida. Serious infections are observed especially in
patients with severe underlying diseases or immunosup-
pression and in neonates. Case-fatality rates for C. auris
bloodstream infections may exceed 30% [12]. However,
attributable mortality is difficult to determine since inva-
sive infections usually occur in severely ill patients with
multiple comorbidities [13].
Since the detection of the first case of C. auris in Switzer-
land in 2018 [14], Swissnoso has become aware through
personal communication of two other cases in Switzerland,
indicating that this emerging fungus has definitively ar-
rived in Switzerland. Lack of awareness could quickly re-
sult in an outbreak if C. auris remains unnoticed or is
detected only once a patient has developed invasive infec-
tion. Clinicians, hospital epidemiologists and microbiolo-
gists therefore need to be prepared for their first case. In
this document, we aim to provide a guidance for infection
prevention and control of C. auris in Swiss healthcare set-
tings.
Methods
Recommendations issued by the US Centers for Disease
Control (CDC) [15], the European Centre for Disease Pre-
vention and Control (ECDC) [16], Public Health England
[17], Pan-American Health Organization / World Health
Organization [18] and Public Health Ontario [19] were re-
viewed and, where available, updated with more recent
published literature. Eventually, since these guidelines are
not harmonised in all aspects, some of the current recom-
mendations rely on consensus opinions from Swissnoso
experts, based on their experience and strategies that have
proven effective in controlling transmission of other multi-
resistant pathogens in the hospital setting (e.g., van-
comycin-resistant enterococci, methicillin-resistant
Staphylococcus aureus).
Epidemiology
C. auris is spreading around the world and has already
been reported from five continents [20]. In Europe, the
highest number of cases have been reported in outbreaks in
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Spain and the UK (table 1). However, sporadic cases have
occurred in several other countries, including our neigh-
bours France, Germany, Austria and Italy [22]. In view of
the fact that some countries still have difficulties in estab-
lishing reliable data, either due to problems with microbi-
ological identification or due to the absence of mandatory
notification, the actual prevalence in some countries may
be underestimated [23].
Mode of transmission
Experience from outbreaks showed that C. auris substan-
tially contaminates mobile equipment and the immediate
environment of colonised or infected patients [5]. Direct
transmission from fomites (such as blood pressure cuffs,
axillary temperature probes, ultrasound machines, physical
therapy equipment and other utensils in contact with the
patient) is a particular risk [17]. Contamination of health-
care workers’ hands with Candida sp. is common [24–26],
but it has proved difficult to show that hand contamination
is a relevant source of transmission in C. auris outbreaks
[3, 4, 6].
Early detection and vigilance
Acute care facilities should have in place a screening pol-
icy for early detection of multidrug resistant organisms,
including C. auris, in order to rapidly identify cases, im-
plement precautionary measures and prevent further trans-
mission within the healthcare facility. Delays in identifica-
tion, through lack of either screening or availability of a
microbiology laboratory on site, can easily lead to clusters
or epidemics.
Admission screening
Screening of high-risk patients transferred from a hospital
abroad with recent C. auris transmission or with endemic
C. auris is strongly encouraged. According to the recent
recommendation issued by the International Society for
Antimicrobial Chemotherapy (ISAC) Working Group on
Infection Prevention and Control (IPC), patients with a re-
cent stay in an intensive care unit in an endemic country
and transfers from hospitals known to have C. auris should
routinely be investigated [27]. Countries reporting C. auris
cases are listed in table 1. The epidemiological profile of
C. auris, however, is evolving. We therefore recommend
checking the CDC’s report on the global tracking of C.au-
ris cases on a regular basis [21].
In view of the global spread, the uncertainty in the iden-
tification of laboratories and possible delays in communi-
cation, virtually any healthcare facility abroad could be af-
fected without knowing it. Therefore, hospitals may even
consider examining all patients referred from a healthcare
facility abroad.
In-hospital screening
Patients
Detection of C. auris in a non-isolated patient from a
healthcare facility should trigger screening of close con-
tacts, including those who had been sharing the room or
equipment. In the absence of firm evidence on the duration
(hours/days) of required overlapping exposure between in-
dex case and close contacts, screening all close contacts
since hospital admission of the index case should be con-
sidered. The screening should include all current ward
mates if detection was in a non-isolated patient during
an intensive care stay or if secondary cases are detected
among roommates. All close contacts should be placed un-
der pre-emptive contact precautions either in a single room
or grouped together in a multi-bed room. Pre-emptive con-
tact precautions can be discontinued after three consecu-
tive negative screenings at a minimum interval of 24 hours
are available [17]. However, the 24-hour interval seems
relatively short to safely rule out C. auris colonisation and
de-isolated contact patients staying at the hospital should
therefore be screened on a weekly basis until their dis-
charge [27].
More intensive actions are required if two or more cases
are identified: all current and previous roommates should
be tested, and ward-wide screening should include any oth-
er patient who had a significant exposure such as sharing
the same equipment [19, 27, 28]. We recommend weekly
point prevalence screenings on affected wards for at least 3
weeks in a row after the last positive case was detected.
Healthcare workers
Contamination of healthcare workers’ hands with Candida
sp. is common [24–26]. However, whether there is chronic
C. auris colonisation in healthcare workers that could pose
a risk for transmission remains unclear. Screening of
healthcare workers is therefore not recommended unless
there is substantial evidence suggesting healthcare workers
as potential source or if ongoing transmission is identified
despite adherence to recommended infection control mea-
sures.
Body sites to test for colonisation
Axilla and groin are the body sites most frequently
colonised with C. auris. The nares, if found positive, usu-
ally have a higher load than other sites. Combining these
Table 1: Countries from which C. auris cases have been reported (data as of 31 December 2019 [21]).
Single cases Transmissions or multiple cases
Europe Austria, Belgium, Greece, Italy, Poland, Norway, Switzer-
land, The Netherlands
France, Germany, Spain, the United Kingdom
Asia and the pacific region Iran, United Arab Emirates, Taiwan, Thailand Australia, Bangladesh, China, India, Israel, Japan, Kuwait, Malaysia, Oman, Pakistan,
Russia, Saudi Arabia, Singapore, South Korea
Africa Egypt Kenya, South Africa
North America Canada, United States (New York City area, New Jersey, Chicago area)
South America Chile, Costa Rica Colombia, Panama, Venezuela
The information in this table has mainly been derived from a Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) website, which is available free of charge. Please note that the
content on the CDC website may be subject to change and its re-use does not imply endorsement by CDC. Other countries not listed in this table may also have undetected or
unreported C. auris cases.
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three sites has been shown to have the highest sensitivity
[11]. The sites most frequently considered in targeted mul-
tidrug-resistant organisms in Switzerland are nose, throat
and groin for multi-resistant Staphylococcus aureus, and
rectum or perianal site for gram-negative multidrug-resis-
tant organisms and vancomycin resistant enterococci [29].
Relying solely on these anatomical sites, however, may not
be sufficient for detection of C. auris [30].
Since admission screening would ideally be combined with
screening for other multidrug-resistant organisms, a rea-
sonable approach – on the basis of sensitivity and logistical
aspects – includes a composite bilateral swab of axilla and
groin and a swab from both nostrils (table 2). Sampling
of other sites (throat, rectum, urine from catheterised pa-
tients, wounds or catheter exit sites) increases the test yield
and can be performed in addition if part of targeted admis-
sion screening for other multidrug-resistant organisms or if
clinically indicated [17, 27, 31].
Microbiological diagnostics
Laboratories should identify isolates of non-albicans Can-
dida species from invasive infections to the species level.
Identification of Candida to species level from non-sterile
sites should be considered if a C. auris case has been
detected in the healthcare facility or if a patient had an
overnight stay within the last 12 months in a healthcare fa-
cility in a country with documented C. auris transmission
[32]. In a previous review [14], our colleagues discussed
the diagnostic challenges and the risk of misidentification
due to similarity with other Candida spp. such as Candi-
da of the haemulonii complex. In brief, C. auris cannot be
identified reliably based on microscopy or growth on chro-
mogenic agar [33]. Matrix assisted laser desorption ionisa-
tions time of flight mass spectrometry (MALDI-TOF MS)
is a reliable identification method. Frequently used MAL-
DI-TOF platforms are MALDI Biotyper (Bruker-Dalton-
ics) and Vitek MS (bioMérieux) [3–5, 34]. Importantly, it
must be assured that different C. auris spectra are includ-
ed in the library and laboratories use the most updated ver-
sions [34]. Laboratories performing MALDI-TOF should
follow the enrichment broth protocol described in Welsh et
al. [7] which is intended for facilitated isolation of C. auris
from various clinical specimens.
Molecular-based methods that can rapidly and accurately
identify C. auris include conventional or real-time PCR
assays [35–37]. These assays can be performed directly
from the clinical specimen and do not require prior culture,
which is very useful when investigating larger outbreaks.
We are aware that not all laboratories serving healthcare fa-
cilities have the means to reliably identify C. auris and test
its susceptibility to the whole panel of antifungal agents. It
is therefore essential to set up a collaboration with a central
laboratory that can provide rapid assistance. All suspicious
isolates should be stored, preferably at −80°C, for further
analysis.
Case management
The suspicion of a microbiological sample being positive
for C. auris should trigger immediate reporting to the in-
fection prevention and control team, in order to implement
adequate measures aiming at identifying and interrupting
transmission (table 3).
Measures upon detection of an incident case in a hospi-
tal
Ideally, enforced contact isolation is applied as soon as C.
auris is suspected in a patient. Upon confirmation of the
identification at the latest, the following actions should be
taken (adapted from [28]):
– Start contact precautions and place the patient in a sin-
gle room with dedicated bathroom/toilet.
– Reinforce standard precautions especially hand hygiene
with an alcohol-based hand rub.
– Perform a case review: obtain information about previ-
ous healthcare facility encounters in the last 3 months
in order to evaluate possible transmissions at other
healthcare institutions.
– Perform contact tracing, since unrecognised colonised
patients pose a risk for transmission identify epidemio-
logically linked patients, especially current and past
roommates and those who shared equipment. These
contact patients need to be screened and if already dis-
charged they should be labelled as contacts in order to
be screened upon re-admission to the facility. Investiga-
tors may even consider as possible contacts patients
who are placed into a room that has recently been va-
cated by a C. auris patient.
– Inform healthcare facilities in which the patient stayed
before being transferred.
Table 2: Recommended body sites for C. auris screening [15, 17].
Minimum standard
Axilla and groin bilaterally, a composite (pooled) swab is acceptable
Nose (both nostrils)
Consider additional sites if clinically relevant
Wounds
Catheter entry site
Sputum / endotracheal secretions
Throat
Drain fluid
Rectum or stool sample
Urine, if catheterised
Vaginal swab
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Contact precautions and isolation
Contact isolation is recommended for all microbiologically
confirmed cases and close contacts. Single rooms should
have a dedicated or en-suite bathroom. We recommend us-
ing dedicated items, preferably single-use items or equip-
ment and discarding them immediately after use. Proper
re-processing according to the manufacturer’s instructions
is crucial for any re-usable item; for example, we strongly
discourage using wipes containing disinfectants if the re-
usable item is in fact difficult to clean with wipes.
Staff and visitors should wear gowns, gloves and surgical
masks upon entry to the room. Swissnoso is aware that
many Swiss hospitals have dropped this procedure for oth-
er multidrug resistant organisms and apply personnel pro-
tective equipment as for standard precautions. However,
due to the high environmental burden of C. auris, this
approach might be insufficient. Importantly, the infection
prevention and control team must ensure regular training
on correct donning and doffing of personal protective
equipment.
Data on transmission by droplets is not known, but C. auris
has been isolated from patients’ nostrils [38]. Wearing a
surgical mask is therefore recommended for staff and vis-
itors when entering a patient’s room and is required for
the patient when exiting the room for a medical proce-
dure. Medical personnel should inform the patient about
not leaving the room otherwise and communicate any med-
ically necessary movement outside the room to the infec-
tion control team.
Clearly, proper hand hygiene as recommended by the
World Health Organization remains the most important
measure to prevent transmission of known or unrecognised
pathogens. After leaving the patient’s room it is of utmost
importance to carry out thorough hand hygiene using al-
coholic hand-rub immediately after removing gowns and
gloves.
Transmission via droplets is unlikely unless a patient has
symptoms of respiratory tract infection and presence of C.
auris in the respiratory tract. After contact with potentially
contaminated respiratory secretions, correct hand hygiene
must be carried out as for standard precautions. To the ex-
tent possible, the number of healthcare workers and other
personnel who care for the C. auris patient should be kept
to a minimum. Since the duration of colonisation remains
largely unknown but can last several months, and no ef-
fective decolonisation scheme is available, colonised or in-
Table 3: Overview of infection prevention and control measures for C. auris single cases and outbreaks. Adapted from Kenters et al. [27]*.
Single/sporadic case(s) Outbreak
Hand hygiene Use an alcohol based† compound Use an alcohol based† compound
Contact isolation
Gloves Single-use, non-sterile
Use per patient when entering the room
Discard when visibly soiled or when leaving the patient
and immediately perform hand hygiene
Single-use, non-sterile
Use per patient when entering the room
Discard when visibly soiled or when leaving the patient and immediate-
ly perform hand hygiene
Gown Staff wears a gown for any direct patient contact
Discard when leaving the patient and immediately per-
form hand hygiene
Staff wears a gown for any direct patient contact and per patient in co-
hort
Discard when leaving the patient and immediately perform hand hy-
giene
Surgical mask Staff wear a mask for any direct patient contact
Required for the patient when exiting the room
Staff wear a mask for any direct patient contact
Required for the patient when exiting the room
Room Single room Single room or cohort positive cases in an area clearly separated from
confirmed negative patients
Ventilation Normal Normal
Toilet / commode / bedpan Dedicated toilet, commode and/or bedpan
En-suite bathroom (if available)
Dedicated toilet, commode, bedpan or en-suite bathroom (if available)
Bathroom can be shared with other cases if cohort area
Bathroom/washbasin Dedicated Dedicated/shared with other cases
Bedding Check pillow and mattresses (when linen is removed)
for damage and discard if damaged
Single use pillows or check pillows and mattresses (when linen is re-
moved) for damage and discard if damaged
Cleaning and disinfection
Cleaning material Single use cloths Single use (microfibre) cloths
Frequency of environmental decontamination Twice daily (affected rooms, at least high-touch sur-
faces)
Twice daily (wards, at least high-touch surfaces)
Small surfaces 70% ethanol or alcohol-based disinfectants and follow
manufacturers’ direction
70% ethanol or alcohol-based disinfectants and follow manufacturers’
direction
Alcohol-sensitive or large surfaces Use disinfectant compound with fungicidal activity
Follow all manufacturers’ direction
Use disinfectant compound with fungicidal activity
Follow all manufacturers’ direction
Surveillance
Index case was not isolated Test current and previous roommates (since hospital
admission of the index case), extend screening to all
current ward mates if secondary cases are identified
Not applicable
Screening frequency Weekly point prevalence testing on intensive care
units (other units, e.g., oncology, to be considered in
individual risk assessment)
Perform weekly point prevalence testing on outbreak wards
In case of ongoing transmission increase frequency from weekly to
twice or thrice weekly point prevalence testing
Alternatively continue weekly prevalence testing and perform additional
screening on admission and at discharge
Inter-hospital transfers
Communication Notify receiving hospital in advance if a C. auris-posi-
tive patient is transferred
Inform healthcare institutions where a patient has
stayed before being transferred
Notify receiving hospitals in advance about the current epidemiological
situation and the perceived risk of any transferred patient of being
colonised or infected with C. auris (room-/ward-mates of a C. auris pos-
itive patient) and any (pending) screening result
* Written permission for re-use was obtained from the responsible author of the original publication. † The product needs to meet the EN1500 testing standard.
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fected patients should be placed under contact isolation for
the duration of the entire hospital stay. After discharge, pa-
tients should remain labelled in an electronic alert system
for early detection and immediate contact isolation upon
readmission.
Five consecutive negative screenings at least one week
apart may allow discontinuation of contact precautions and
isolation. However, we advise the first control swabs to be
taken only after a period of 3–6 months and to maintain
flagging of patients for at least 1 year after the first nega-
tive culture [27].
Communication
Microbiologists should inform the local infection and con-
trol team as soon as C. auris is suspected (e.g., when
non-C. albicans isolates with fluconazole resistance are
found) to allow rapid implementation of necessary infec-
tion control measures. Colonised and infected patients, as
well as close contacts, without at least three consecutive
negative screenings 1 week apart should be (electronically)
labelled in their patient file. Patients and their family
should be informed about the importance of contact iso-
lation measures and what they can do to prevent C. auris
from spreading. A communication standard for inter-facil-
ity transfers must be in place. After discharge the gener-
al practitioner must be informed. Since reporting of a sin-
gle C. auris case to the Federal Office of Public Health is
not mandatory, we strongly advise at least informing col-
leagues and collaborators about such an epidemiologically
important finding.
Environmental decontamination
Survival in the hospital environment, particularly on plas-
tic [7] and moist surfaces [8] facilitates persistence of C.
auris. However, it is not commonly found in the general
environment or air [5]. Thorough cleaning and disinfection
of patient equipment and the surrounding area is critical to
prevent spreading of this organism and to break the chain
of transmission. Daily environmental cleaning and disin-
fection should be intensified to a minimum twice daily for
at least all high-touch surfaces on wards with C. auris pos-
itive patients [27]. Thoroughness of terminal environmen-
tal decontamination after discharge of a C. auris positive
patient should be reinforced using a compound with ade-
quate fungicidal efficacy. International guidelines recom-
mend using high-strength (1000 ppm) chlorine-based or
hydrogen-peroxide-containing disinfectants. However, any
surface disinfectant with approved fungicidal and sporici-
dal activity (e.g., effective against Clostridioides difficile)
is effective provided the recommended contact time is fol-
lowed [3, 6]. The exception are water-based quaternary
ammonium compounds, which seem to have poor activity
against C. auris, and their use is therefore discouraged [39,
40]. Efficacy of no-touch disinfectant technologies such
as ultraviolet light on killing of C. auris on surfaces de-
pends largely on contact time and distance of the surfaces
from the light source, but data are still limited. Ultraviolet
light disinfection is recommended as an adjunctive disin-
fecting method for terminal cleaning if available, after the
surface has been thoroughly cleaned and disinfected [41,
42]. Everything that cannot be cleaned must be discarded
(e.g., porous materials, etc.).
Waste management
Bedding, towels and cloths should be replaced when vis-
ibly soiled and/or after patient discharge, and machine
washed. We recommend following the “Minimum stan-
dards for handling contaminated laundry in the healthcare
sector” issued by the Swiss Society of Hospital Hygiene
[43].
Decolonisation of patients
There is no established decolonisation regimen. Chlorhex-
idine gluconate and povidone iodine are effective in killing
C. auris in vitro [44, 45]. Chlorhexidine gluconate com-
bined with topical mupirocin have shown some effect on
reducing candiduria in patients in intensive care when uni-
versally applied [46]. However, the prolonged C. auris out-
breaks in the UK and Spain showed that despite decoloni-
sation efforts using daily chlorhexidine gluconate washes
patients continued to be colonised or developed new can-
didaemia episodes [3, 4]. This may be explained by re-
colonisation from the contaminated environment (e.g.,
bedlinen, mattresses), insufficient contact time and the rel-
atively low chlorhexidine gluconate concentration of 2%
commonly used in clinical practice [44]. Therefore, as a
validated and published decolonisation regimen is lacking,
no firm recommendation can be made until further studies
are available.
Additional measures for outbreaks
– Assess for potential causes of transmission: most criti-
cal are inadequate hand hygiene performed by health-
care providers and lack of appropriate cleaning and dis-
infection of mobile equipment or the environment.
– Reinforce adherence with hand hygiene including prop-
er hand hygiene techniques and contact precaution mea-
sures.
– Promptly initiate an epidemiological investigation and
perform cross-sectional screening of contact patients
for C. auris carriage.
– Ensure that the microbiology laboratory stores all spec-
imens for further investigations.
– Cohort C. auris positive patients in a dedicated area
and, if possible, with dedicated nursing staff.
– Separate contact patients under investigation for C. au-
ris carriage from confirmed negative cases.
– Reinforce importance of thoroughly decontaminating
the environment, by means of educational sessions and
observation of appropriate implementation.
– Consider ceasing new admissions to affected rooms/
wards if the outbreak cannot be contained.
– Perform weekly ward-wide surveillance cultures.
– If significant transmission is identified on weekly point
prevalence testing despite implementation of infection
control measures enhance frequency (e.g., 2–3 times
per week) and/or add admission and discharge screen-
ing.
– Environmental screening is not recommended unless
epidemiological investigation points towards a specific
environmental source or if ongoing transmission occurs
despite adherence to recommended interventions. Con-
sider regular (e.g., daily) audit monitoring by using
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adenosine triphosphate detectors or a fluorescent mark-
er substance, to ensure appropriate environmental hy-
giene.
– Hospital management support is required to provide ad-
equate resources.
– Obtain guidance from an experienced outbreak man-
agement team and liaise with national infection control
experts.
– Adjust empirical treatment regimens for suspected fun-
gal infections, in close coordination with the infectious
diseases service.
When to declare an outbreak terminated
An outbreak can be considered over if no new patient has
been identified on clinical or screening specimens over a
3-week period, and at least three unit-wide point preva-
lence studies are negative [19].
Summary
Why C. auris is a problem
– Healthcare-associated infections: C. auris causes se-
rious infections, mainly bloodstream infections.
– Limited treatment options: C. auris is often resistant
to several antifungal drug classes; especially azoles are
often not active. Some C. auris infections have been re-
sistant to all three types of antifungal drugs (azoles,
echinocandins and polyenes).
– It is difficult to identify: C. auris can be misidentified
as other types of fungi unless specialised laboratory
technology (MALDI-TOF or PCR) is used.
– Potential for spread: C. auris can spread silently in
hospitals and nursing homes. Outbreaks in healthcare
facilities have been difficult to control. It can spread
through contact with affected patients and contaminated
surfaces or equipment.
What can we do?
– Be alert and know the pathogen as epidemiologically
important.
– Inform colleagues and collaborators about this new
emerging pathogen.
– Screen patients at risk on admission and take swabs
from axilla, groin and nose.
– Immediately isolate newly detected cases and investi-
gate contacts around the index case.
– Perform good hand hygiene and reinforce thorough dis-
infection in healthcare facilities.
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